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Surface Mining and'Environmental
Quality: An Economic Perspective
By ALAN RANDALL AND ANGELOS PAGOULATOS*
Coal fueled the development of America from a rustic fron-
tier society to a major industrial power in the 19th century.
Although its relative importance continually declined through-
out the present century as oil and natural gas became the major
sources of energy for America, many observers expect coal to
reassume its prominent position as a source of energy.' Produc-
tion of coal peaked in 1972, but has remained high in later
years. The trend toward the declining importance of coal has
been reversed, and by 1974 coal contributed about 18 percent
of the total energy consumed in that year.2 In spite of this
increase in output, the total number of mines is decreasing.
The ones remaining, however, are becoming larger and more
productive .
Despite the recent slight decrease in total coal production,
output of coal from surface mines has continued to increase,
amounting to almost 50 percent of total United States coal
production in 1974.1 In Appalachia, the hilly terrain imposes
severe difficulties for surface mining, which accounts for only
37 percent of its coal output.5 The expansion of surface mining
* Alan Randall and Angelos Pagoulatos are, respectively, Associate Professor and
Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of Kentucky.
This paper is published with the approval of the Director of the Kentucky Agricul-
tural Experiment Station. The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments
of Richard Ausness and the assistance of Larry Bynum and Webb Smathers.
I The price of crude oil has increased due to the activity of the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which was formed in 1960 as a reaction
to decreasing prices of crude petroleum and has become a cartel that sells a license to
produce in order to keep prices above cost.
I Coal production for the United States in 1972 was 595.4 million short tons with
Appalachia producing 374 million short tons. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTE-
RIOR, MINERALS YEARBOOK 1973, Vol. I, at 317-77 (1975). The average value of Appa-
lachian coal was $9.53 per ton in 1973. The average price of coal continued to increase
in 1974 and appears to have declined from 1974 levels during 1975.
In 1973, there were 4,744 active coal mines in the United States, of which 4,400
were located in Appalachia. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF




is best explained by cost advantages, which stem in large part
from the labor savings possible with surface mining operations.
Presently estimated coal reserves are about 3,200 billion
tons, of which one-half has been positively identified and the
remaining half is estimated to exist in areas which have not
been explored and mapped. Up to the end of 1970, 36 billion
tons had been mined. It is estimated that of the reserves cur-
rently identified, 390 billion tons could be recovered with cur-
rent technology, of which 200 billion tons could be mined at
1973 costs.'
Coal mining contributes signficantly to the gross national
product and is a major employer in the United States.7 More-
over, its importance is likely to increase in the future as coal is
substituted for relatively scarce sources of energy. While the
coal mining industry is expected to expand more rapidly in the
midwest and far west than in Appalachia, the Appalachian
region will remain a major source of coal. It is also expected
that surface mining will continue to increase in importance
relative to underground mining.8
Although the coal mining industry has contributed to eco-
nomic development and improved standards of living in Amer-
ica, it has not traditionally been associated with a high quality
of life in the regions in which it operates? In recent years, as a
result of the current demand for coal and improved mining
technology, the social and environmental problems associated
with the coal industry appear less severe.'0 Nevertheless, in the
coal producing regions of Appalachia, income and labor force
participation rates remain substantially below the national
6 Risser, The U.S. Energy Dilemma: The Gap Between Today's Requirements and
Tomorrow's Potential, 64 ENVIRONMENTAL GEOLOGY NOTES 39 (Illinois Geological Sur-
vey, 1973).
7 In 1973 the average number of men working daily in coal mining in the United
States was 148,000 of which 120,000 were in Appalachia. Twenty-three percent of that
total coal labor force were employed in surface mining. In Appalachia that figure was
18 percent. Average output per man per day in the United States was 11.7 tons for
underground mines and 36.6 for surface mines. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERAL INDUSTRY SURVEYS, COAL-BITUMINOUS AND LIG-
NiTE IN 1973 (1974).
N Miernyk, Coal and the Future of Appalachian Economy, 9:2 APPALACHIA 29
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Miernyk].
I See, e.g., M. BOWMAN AND W. HAYNES, RESOURCES AND PEOPLE OF EASTERN
KENTUCKY (1963), and H. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS (1962).
1" See Miernyk, supra note 8.
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average." In addition, government seems unable to provide
services such as education and roads at the levels taken for
granted in other parts of America, 2 and environmental prob-
lems, particularly water pollution, and the damage done to the
land in the process of surface mining, are yet to be solved
satisfactorily.
3
Given the broad impact of the coal industry on the quality
of life in the regions in which it operates, the focus of this
article is quite narrow. We will consider only the surface min-
ing industry and its impact on environmental quality, provid-
ing an economic perspective of the role of legislation and regu-
lation in influencing the environmental performance of the in-
dustry.
I. THE LAW AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Legislation and regulation contribute to the total package
of incentives which guide economic activity. By tracing the
relationship between the structure of incentives and economic
performance, it is possible to evaluate the role of legislation
and regulation.
A. Efficiency and Maximum Welfare
There are two concepts helpful in evaluating economic
performance: efficiency and maximum social welfare. The eco-
nomic definition of efficiency includes the popular notion of
least-cost production, that goods and services should be pro-
duced in the manner entailing the lowest possible cost, but is
somewhat broader. An efficient economy also produces its
goods and services in proportions consistent with the demands
of consumers and distributes these goods and services among
consumers in such a way that no one can improve his position
through trading. Trading is useful for moving the economy
toward efficiency but, once efficiency has been attained, no
profitable trading opportunities remain. An economy is said to
be efficient when it is so organized that no conceivable change
1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, UNITED STATES
SUMMARY (1970).




can be made, no resources can be reallocated and no goods and
services can be redistributed, to improve anyone's position
without simultaneously worsening the position of someone else.
Obviously efficiency of production and distribution is a
desirable state for any economy, even if it is a rather idealistic
goal which may be approached under favorable circumstances
but probably never achieved. However, even if efficiency were
achieved, the economic problem would not necessarily be
solved. The highest economic goal, maximum social welfare,
requires not only efficiency but also that income, or purchasing
power, be distributed in a manner consistent with society's
preferences. Efficiency of production and distribution and an
optimal or, at least, acceptable distribution of income are both
valid economic goals which, because of their interrelationship,
cannot be pursued independently. 4
B. Legal Rights and Efficiency
A system of rights defines the proper relationships among
individuals in a society and the penalities for violation of these
proper relationships. Property rights are those rights which
refer to the proper relationships among people with respect to
the use of things. Most legislative and regulatory activity in-
volves the definition, specification and enforcement of rights.
An imaginary society, wiping clean its whole slate of laws
and institutions in order to start anew, would have a wide
choice among the possible specifications of its system of rights.
The distribution of income, wealth, and economic and political
power is influenced by the specification of rights, and, in addi-
tion, resource allocation and the production and exchange of
goods and services is much influenced by the way in which
rights are specified. Since 1776, when Adam Smith published
" For any given distribution of income, an efficient solution may be conceivable,
and for each different distribution the efficient solution, if it exists, will be different.
The solution to the economic problem requires the socially optimal distribution of
income and the particular efficient pattern of resource allocation and commodity dis-
tribution consistent with that distribution. The reader must be cautioned, however,
that no practicable method for determining society's distributional preferences has
been found, while theorems purporting to show that it is impossible to determine
societal preferences in a democratic manner have been proved. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND- INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). Thus, the notion of maximum social welfare,
while conceptually valid, has proven operationally intractable.
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The Wealth of Nations, the idea that unregulated private
enterprise may work toward the general public welfare has had
some currency. In the last 200 years, much of the intellectual
activity of economists has been directed toward defining, with
ever increasing rigor and precision, the conditions under which
unregulated private activity may result in economic efficiency.
It is not impossible for a centrally planned economy to
approach efficiency; but it requires expensive, time consuming,
highly competent planning based on a wealth of detailed infor-
mation and economic intelligence. The beauty of the private
enterprise system is that under certain specific conditions it
has an inherent tendency to generate efficient outcomes with-
out need for the oversight of economic planners.'5 Under these
precise conditions, unregulated markets will function effi-
ciently, private costs will equal social costs, and private eco-
nomic activity will respond to incentives which direct it along
socially beneficial lines. Where markets are noncompetitive
and property rights are attenuated, inefficiency will result.
C. Environmental Externalities
One kind of inefficiency of great interest in the context of
coal mining is externality, a situation in which the acts of one
party influence the welfare of an affected party but the adverse
or beneficial impact on the affected party does not enter the
decisions of the acting party. In the case of external disecon-
omy, the externality has an adverse influence on the welfare of
the affected party. Some of the private costs of the acting party
are transferred to the affected party and hence private and
social costs are not equal. The usual consequences of external
diseconomy are that more than the efficient amount of damage
is done to the affected parties, more than the efficient amount
of the commodity associated with the external diseconomy is
" The primary requisite conditions are as follows:
1. Markets must be competitive. No individual buyer or seller should be able to
materially influence prices and the marketing activities themselves should be per-
formed in a competitive fashion.
2. Property rights to resources and commodities must be nonattenuated.
Nonattenuated property rights are: a) Completely specified, to provide an effective
information system; b) exclusive, so that all rewards and penalties from an act accrue
to the actor; c) enforced, since an unenforced right is without effect; and d) transfera-
ble, so that property rights may gravitate to their highest use.
1976]
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produced and consumed, and the price of the associated com-
modity is lower than the efficient price.
Unreasonable external diseconomy is permitted to occur
when the rights of the parties are not properly specified and
enforced. Those external diseconomies which are most signifi-
cant in terms of the amount of damage done and the extent of
the deviation from efficiency tend to be those where it is not
traditional practice, or it is physically difficult or impossible,
to establish private rights over affected resources. For example,
trespass is a problem which is relatively easy to control since
courts have firmly established the rights of private owners of
real property to exclude intruders. But air pollution has proven
almost impossible for private law to control since exclusive
rights to air have not been established and would be difficult
to establish and enforce due to the physical characteristics of
air."6
The environmental impact of coal mining can be concep-
tualized in these terms. Where mineral rights are dominant to
surface rights, and where the rights to clean air and water,
natural ecosystems, and aesthetically pleasing landscapes are
unspecified or nonexclusive, coal mining operators are in a pos-
ition to transfer their costs to others. Where coal operators may
use the waterways free of charge for waste disposal, and where
those rights to environmental quality which are vested in the
general public remain unenforced, the process of transferring
private costs to the public continues unimpeded.
D. Internalization of Externalities
Internalization is the name given to the process by which
an external diseconomy is returned to efficiency.' 7 Where the
establishment of nonattenuated property rights is a simple
11 See, e.g., Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (App. Div. 1932);
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & Eco. 1 (1960).
11 Complete internalization of an externality eliminates the source of inefficiency
and, if the economy is otherwise efficient, results in efficiency. It cannot be overem-
phasized that complete internalization of an externality such as environmental dam-
age will usually reduce the extent of the damage but not eliminate it completely.
Distasteful as it may seem to the dedicated environmentalist, there is some efficient
amount of environmental damage; too little damage and too much damage are both
inefficient. See Mishan, What is the Optimal Level of Pollution, 82 J. POL. Eco. 1278
(1974).
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matter and is not contrary to the physical nature of the re-
source concerned or the ethical and moral norms of society, this
is the simplest approach. Then, private negotiations among the
involved parties will tend to bring about an efficient solution.',
Where it is difficult or impossible to establish exclusive
private property rights over the affected resources such as air,
water, and landscape aesthetics, internalization must proceed
through the exercise of governmental power, usually the police
power or the power to tax. The use of the police power involves
enforcement of some collective property rights in the name of
the public welfare, while the power to tax works to achieve
internalization through the price system.
Regulation, by exercise of the police power, limits private
property rights and expands the rights of the collective by pro-
hibiting acts which result in external diseconomies, or con-
straining them within acceptable limits, for example by setting
pollution emissions standards. Since regulation increases the
costs faced by the parts regulated, providing the incentive for
violation, procedures for detection of violations and assessment
of penalties must be established. The assessment of taxes or
charges on external diseconomies, as in the case of a charge per
unit of polluting emissions, is intended to confront the acting
party (the polluter) with the social costs of his actions, and
thus encourage internalization through the equalization of pri-
vate and social costs.
Each of these general methods of solving externality
problems has its advantages and its difficulties.'" The assess-
ment of per unit charges on external diseconomies has gained
much favor among economists. Advantages are that enforce-
ment can be made routine, since it involves only the monitor-
ing of damage and the collection of the charge; and that the
charge provides incentive for internalization while leaving the
acting party free to determine the least costly method of con-
trolling or ameliorating the damage. Where damage is not com-
'1 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & Econ. 1 (1960). In the
subsequent literature discussing the issues first raised by Coase, the conditions under
which this type of market solution can be successful were defined. See Randall,
Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (1974).




pletely eliminated, the charge paid can be viewed as compensa-
tion from the acting party to the general public for damage
caused. Several difficulties are encountered in using the
method of per unit charges for damage. Substantial research is
needed to determine the proper amount of the charge. For effi-
ciency, the per unit charge should be equal to the dollar value
of the damage caused per unit of externality. Also charge sys-
tems encounter political opposition from the creators of exter-
nal diseconomies, who see them as expensive to themselves,
and from legislators and administrators who are more comfort-
able with police power regulation.'
Regulation is often politically acceptable, perhaps because
it is easily understood. A simple rule of thumb is established:
damage must be kept within prescribed bounds, and it is a
violation of the law to exceed those bounds. However, regula-
tions are likely to be inefficient for several reasons. Standards
are nontransferable, hence efficiency can only be achieved with
standards as a result of perfect planning. The standard set
should coincide with the efficient level of internalization. Yet,
substantial information is needed to calculate that level, and
the optimum standard, once determined, must survive at-
tempts at modification in the political, administrative, and
judicial processes. Standards tend to be inflexible, while the
efficient level of internalization may change over time as eco-
nomic conditions change and new techniques of controlling and
ameliorating damage are introduced. Regulations which man-
date or subsidize the use of particular methods of reducing
damage are especially inefficient since they discourage the de-
velopment and implementation of alternative and perhaps
superior techniques of damage control. Finally, enforcement of
standards has tended in practice to be haphazard and some-
times less than enthusiastic. Enforcement agencies have been
reluctant to assess penalties commensurate with the damage
caused by violation, and variances and extensions for compli-
ance are often granted.
2 '
20 Id. See Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities: Reply, 54 AM.
Eco. R. 412 (1974); Plott, Externalities and Corrective Taxes, 33 ECONoMIcA 84 (1966);
Thompson and Batchelder, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 58 AMER.
Eco. R. 466 (1974).
21 See FREEMAN, supra note 19.
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E. Summary
The law, by specifying the proper relationships among in-
dividuals in a society and the penalties for violation of these
relationships, provides a substantial part of the structure of
incentives which guides the functioning of the economy. Under
certain rather precise conditions, an unregulated economy will
achieve efficiency and, in the best of all economic worlds, an
efficient solution consistent with maximum social welfare is
conceivable. In the real world, efficiency is not achieved due to
noncompetitive influences and inadequacies in the laws which
define rights, and, in particular, property rights.
The adverse environmental impact of coal mining may be
diagnosed as externalities, where externality is one specific
form of inefficiency. Each method of internalization has its
advantages and its difficulties. Transaction costs, the costs of
making and enforcing decisions,2 2 are an important considera-
tion in selecting the appropriate legal mechanism for solving
externality problems. In very general terms, a good system of
legal rights would have the following properties: it would en-
courage efficient or relatively efficient outcomes, keep transac-
tion costs within acceptable bounds and have a socially accept-
able distributive impact. Clearly, we are seeking the best of the
available imperfect solutions.
While the regulatory approach has its advantages and a
long tradition of political acceptance, it has potential economic
disadvantages. Legal alternatives to regulation should be
seriously considered, and, where regulation appears to be the
most fruitful approach, care should be taken to draft regula-
tions which are more, rather than less, conducive to economic
efficiency.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Quantitative economic analysis is essential to provide an
adequate amount of information to guide social policy with
respect to the environment.
2 Transaction costs include the private and public costs of decision making, as




A. Benefits and Costs of Environmental Policies
Efficient internalization of environmental externalities
requires that the damage be reduced to that point where the
benefits from an additional step are just equal to the costs of
that step, given that total benefits exceed total costs. The costs
of environmental improvements ars simple to calculate, pro-
vided the necessary engineering and biological data are avail-
able. However, measuring the benefits of environmental im-
provements is difficult. One analysis equates the benefits of a
certain level of environmental improvement with the costs
which would have been caused by the damage if it had been
allowed to continue, thus defining benefits from environmental
improvements in terms of cost avoidance.3
Environment refers to the totality of natural resources in-
cluding the intricate interrelationships among living and non-
living things which constitute ecosystems and biomes. Envi-
ronmental damage occurs when waste from one resource use
affects the quantity and quality of a resource supply so as to
preclude the use of that resource, increase costs, or reduce the
benefits of a later use of the resource. Not all changes in re-
source quality are damaging, however. Some changes may be
beneficial to later uses.
Environmental quality changes are economically relevant
when they affect later uses to which resources may be put to
meet the future demands of people. In ascribing dollar values
to the costs of environmental damage, later uses of affected
resources must be traced and dollar values ascribed to the pre-
clusion of later uses, losses in productivity of later uses, and
increased costs of treatment to improve or restore the quality
of the resource for later uses.
Where changes in resource quality are irreversible, such
changes, even if they may not seem damaging at the time they
take place, may preclude options for resource use which may
become feasible in the future due to technological develop-
ments and changes in demand. Foreclosure of future options
must be evaluated as an opportunity cost of achieving present
2' In A. KNEESE AND B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMics, TECHNOL-
OGY AND INSTITUTIONS (1967) the authors use a similar approach.
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goals. 4 While it is often difficult to place dollar values on these
types of foreclosed options, it is appropriate to view irreversible
environmental damage with a good deal of suspicion.
Quantitative economic evaluation of the benefits of avoid-
ing environmental damage is most difficult when the later uses
affected are of a nonmarket nature. Aesthetic and recreational
uses fall into this category, as does the social disruption which
accompanies some types of resource use. Progress in developing
techniques for these types of analyses is being made and some
studies have been completed which appear accurate and relia-
ble. 5 Nevertheless, the technology of economic analysis re-
mains underdeveloped in these directions.
B. The Economic Impact of Environmental Policies
As we have indicated, where an external diseconomy ex-
ists, the price of the commodity associated with the externality
will be lower than the efficient price, and the quantity of the
commodity produced and consumed will be more than the effi-
cient amount. After a society has had years to accustom itself
to an externality, the process of internalization, when it even-
tually occurs, will, to some degree, reduce production and in-
crease the price of the associated commodity. Thus, internali-
zation to return the situation to efficiency may seem expensive
and perhaps economically disruptive. Proper planning of
environmental policy should include consideration and analy-
sis of these factors.
HI. SURFACE MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Already more than a million acres in Appalachia have
been surface mined, and it is estimated that 31 million acres
in Appalachia overlie reserves of coal." Thus, surface mining
11 Opportunity costs of a decision to use a resource in a certain way are defined
as the net value of alternatives which are foregone as a result of that decision.
2 See, e.g., M. Clawson, Methods of Measuring the Demand for and Value of
Outdoor Recreation (Reprint 10, Resources for the Future, 1959); Davis, Recreation
Planning as an Economic Problem, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 239 (1963); Freeman, On
Estimating Air Pollution Control Benefits from Land Value Studies, 1 J. ENVIR. Eco.
MGT. 74 (1974); and Randall, Ives, and Eastman, Bidding Games for Valuation of
Asthetic Environmental Improvements, 1 J. ENVIR. Eco. MGT. 132 (1974).
25 W. Curtis, Strip Mining, Erosion and Sedimentation (paper presented to Amer-
ican Society of Agricultural Engineers, #70-222, July 7-10, 1970).
19761
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
is a significant form of land use in Appalachia as well as a
major source of coal. In Appalachian Kentucky, permits to
strip more than 40,000 acres were issued in a single year, 1974.27
Surface mining of coal generates environmental damage in
several ways. The disturbance of land and its vegetative cover
and the removal and deposition of overburden may increase the
amount of run-off following rain and the concentration of soil
particles suspended in the run-off. The frequency and severity
of floods may be increased and water quality may be adversely
affected by increased sediment and concentration of harmful
chemicals in the run-off. Surface mining may result in in-
creased incidence of erosion and slides, reducing the land's
productivity in agricultural and forest uses and perhaps de-
stroying productive land and buildings. The process of disturb-
ing the land surface and the removal and deposition of overbur-
den destroys natural ecosystems and the aesthetic quality of
the landscape, diminishing its value for purposes in which aes-
thetic characteristics are important.
Clearly, where surface mining is uncontrolled and its nega-
tive environmental impact unmitigated, external diseconomies
exist. Many of the true costs of surface mining are transferred
from mining operators and consumers of coal to the affected
public. Later uses of the land resources which are diminished
in value include agriculture; forestry; extraction of minerals;
recreation; transportation; residential, commercial and in-
dustrial uses; and the maintenance of land-based ecosystems.
The water resource has many of the same functions in addition
to household and industrial uses, navigation, recreation and
the support of water based ecosystems.
The severity of environmental impact depends on the ex-
tent of surface mining in the affected region, the technique of
surface mining used and the methods of handling overburden
and disposal of wastes, the depth of overburden, the slope of
the land, and the climatic and geological features of the region.
Thus, the economic value of the damage associated with sur-
face mining will vary among mining sites, as well as among the
different mining regions of the country.
27 CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, ENFORCEMENT OF STRIP MINING
LAWS 23 (Washington, 1975).
[Vol. 64
SUItFACE MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A. The Costs of Reclamation
Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory"8 have esti-
mated the cost of various reclamation procedures in the Appa-
lachian coal fields. At the risk of oversimplification, we will
attempt to summarize their preliminary estimates. Average
operating costs estimated at 1972 prices for basic reclamation,
defined as spoil stabilization sufficient to prevent off-site dam-
ages from groundslides, erosion, and water run-off, were in the
range of 25 to 60 cents per ton of coal produced. Full reclama-
tion, defined as basic reclamation plus the return of the land
to a state of useful productivity and restoration and enhance-
ment of landscape aesthetics, would cost from 65 to 95 cents
per ton.2'1 By contrast, reclamation costs for surface mines in
North Dakota were estimated to fall in the range of 4 to 11
cents per ton of coal mined.3 1
B. Benefits of Reclamation
In order to determine the economic efficiency of reclama-
tion, it is necessary to know both its benefits and its costs. To
justify reclamation, in the economic sense, benefits should
exceed costs. While the costs of reclamation reported in North
Dakota are only a few cents per ton of coal mined, they amount
to around $800 per acre of surface mined land. Part of this total
cost is attributable to the costs of preventing off-site damages,
but the greater proportion is for returning the land to an
acceptable condition. With land in that region selling at $50
Hereinafter referred to as ORNL.
R. Carlsmith, R. Spore, and E. Nephew, Systems Studies of Coal Production-
Progress Report, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Dec. 1974). In this report, the slope
of the terrain, maximum high wall height and mining method were variables which
influenced reclamation costs. Reclamation costs were also related to total annual re-
gional output. If output were to be substantially increased in the shortrun, this might
require mining in more difficult terrain and mining shallower seams underlying deeper
overburden. Thus, reclamation costs might increase (and would in fact increase sub-
stantially in Northern and Southern Appalachia but not in Central Appalachia) if total
output of coal were substantially expanded.
31 Hertsgaard and Leistritz, Environmental Impact of Strip Mining: The Eco-
nomic and Social Viewpoints, in SOME ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF STRIP MINING IN
NORTH DAKOTA 73 (M. Wali ed.) (Educ. Ser. 5, North Dakota Geological Survey, Grand
Forks, North Dakota, 1973).
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to $150 per acre, 3' the economic justification for reclamation
would require that the discounted future value of the land be
several times the value indicated by the current market price
for agricultural uses. This is not impossible, since the market
system tends to be somewhat myopic and materially oriented.
Future considerations tend to be heavily discounted, with
aesthetic and social values subordinated to those values more
easily measured in dollars.
In Appalachia, several studies to quantify as completely as
possible the economic benefits from reclamation are now in
progress.2 Some preliminary results have been obtained at the
University of Tennessee.33 In five case study watersheds, the
economic value of damage due to surface mining, and hence
the benefits from abatement of that damage, were estimated
to be from $.60 to $1.40 in 1973 dollars, per ton of coal mined.
Aesthetic and social considerations were not fully incorporated
into these tentative estimates, so they may be regarded as
lower bounds on the value of the benefits from full reclamation.
This range of benefits overlaps to some extent the costs of
reclamation estimated by the ORNL researchers. 4 Thus, it
seems that the benefits of full reclamation exceed the costs in
at least some cases.3 5 Further refinements in estimating the
economic value of social and aesthetic benefits from reclama-
tion may result in upward revisions of the benefits.
C. The Economic Impact of Reclamation Requirements
The White House, in justifying the Presidential veto of the
1975 surface mining bill, 36 claimed that the provisions of this
31 Id.
One study is being made under the direction of the authors and their colleagues.
Bohm, Moore and Schmidt-Bleek, Benefits and Costs of Surface Mine Recla-
mation in Appalachia, in ENERGY AND MAN: TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
ENERGY, 441-447 (M. Morgan ed. 1975).
Supra note 29.
In the Tennessee case studies, supra note 33, the estimates of reclamation costs
were higher than the estimates in the ORNL study, supra, note 29. This is because
the Tennessee case studies were all of orphan mines. Reclamation is less expensive
when proper preparation for reclamation is undertaken during mining. The Tennessee
researchers concluded that, in their case studies, the benefits they were able to mea-
sure recovered a substantial proportion of the estimated costs of reclamation but did
not exceed the costs.
H.R. 25, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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bill would substantially reduce coal output and eliminate
36,000 jobs.3 However, ORNL researchers estimate that full
reclamation and the proposed $0.35 per ton tax to finance re-
clamation of abandoned surface mines would reduce Appa-
lachian coal output by 7.5 million tons, 2 percent of current
Appalachian output, raise the average price of coal by $0.35 per
ton and result in the direct and indirect loss of no more than
932 jobs in Appalachia .3 This study was based on 1972 prices.
Considering that coal prices increased dramatically in 1973 and
1974 and, in spite of declines during 1975, remain well above
1972 levels," it is likely that the present impact of reclamation
laws on coal output and employment may be less, rather than
more, substantial than suggested by the ORNL study. The cost
estimates for reclamation in North Dakota' suggest that recla-
mation requirements would have only a small impact on coal
output in the Upper Great Plains.
These rather tentative studies suggest that much of the
environmental damage from the surface mining of coal can be
eliminated or substantially reduced without major cost in-
creases. The predicted price increases and reductions in output
and coal-related employment are relatively small. On this
basis, it can be argued that strong reclamation requirements
are well within the tolerance of the economy.
D. Summary of the Available Economic Information
The available economic data is tentative and inconclusive
at this time. However, some data suggests that reclamation
requirements are unlikely to reduce the output of coal and the
employment generated by the coal extraction industry sub-
stantially.' In many situations, the benefits from full reclama-
tion may exceed the costs. In other cases, basic reclamation at
least may be economically justified. In cases where reclamation
is too costly, the public must decide whether surface mining
should be permitted. Since external diseconomies are occurring
n Louisville Courier-Journal May 20, 1975 at 20, sec. A.
" Lin, Spore, and Nephew, Land Reclamation and Strip Mined Coal Production
in Appalachia, J. ENviR. ECON. MGT. (1976).
Supra note 2.
Supra note 30 and accompanying text.
" Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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in which environmental costs are transferred from coal opera-
tors to the public, the operators may reasonably be confronted
with these costs and the public compensated for the damage it
suffers.
IV. LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING SURFACE MINING
With the above considerations in mind, it is possible to
discuss the existing legal and regulatory framework within
which the surface mining industry operates, to consider the
economic implications of the existing framework, and to make
some tentative suggestions as to future legal change.
A. Private Law
Coal mining, along with all other types of economic
activity, is subject to the provisions of private law. Property
law offers some protection to holders of rights to the surface
estate and the mineral estate.4 2 However, Kentucky still recog-
nizes the so-called "broad form deed" which assigns to the
mineral right holder a set of rights which are dominant to those
of the surface right holder.13 Minerals may be extracted without
the permission of the surface right holder, who may recover
damages caused in the process of mining only under extremely
limited circumstances.44 Courts in other states where broad
form deeds were prevalent have substantially weakened and
circumscribed these deeds, reassigning some rights to the sur-
face estate."
42 See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 15-18 (1969); F. TRELEASE, H.
BLOOMENTHAL & J. GERAUD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NATURAL RESOURCES 858-1054
(1965); 54 AM. JUR. 2d, Mines and Minerals §§ 102-147 (1971).
11 Schneider, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 Ky. L.J. 653-57 (1970-71); Note,
Kentucky'i Experience with the Broad Form Deed, 63 Ky. L.J. 107 (1974-75). The
broad form deed was again upheld in Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, No. 73-539
(Ky., May 28, 1976). Concurring opinions by Justice Stevenson and Chief Justice Reed
however, indicated a willingness to reconsider Buchanon v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40
(Ky. 1956) at least prospectively. It is upon Buchanon that much of Kentucky's broad
form deed law rests.
" E.g., Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968); Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960); Buchanon v. Watson, 290
S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
15 Note, Construction of Deeds Granting the Right to Strip Mine, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 304 (1971); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Heflin, 366 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1961); Frank-
lin v. Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio C.P. 1954); Stewart v. Chernicky, 266 A.2d 259
[Vol. 64
SURFACE MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In principle, nuisance law allows a land owner to seek ei-
ther injunctive relief or recovery of damages where the actions
of another land owner unreasonably interfere with the use and
enjoyment of his property." This aspect of private law has had
limited effectiveness in controlling the results of surface min-
ing, however, as a result of judicial interpretation and the per-
vasive influence of the broad form deed.
47
Conceivably, a riparian water law could be interpreted so
as to define stream pollution resulting from surface mining as
an unreasonable use, thus permitting a riparian user to seek
injunctive relief for damages.48 However, this avenue has been
of limited effectiveness, because strict standards of proof of
causation are applied and joinder of multiple parties is often
difficult.'"
In summary, the historic performance of the surface
mining industry has been such as to suggest that private law,
as judicially interpreted, has not been adequate to control the
externalities created by the industry. Thus, we turn to an ex-
amination of laws and regulations enacted to control surface
mining.
B. Regulation of Surface Mining
Most states in which surface mining occurs have by now
enacted legislation controlling surface mining and requiring
some degree of reclamation.-" Surface mining statutes com-
(Pa. 1970); Campbell v. Campbell, 199 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946); Oresta v.
Romano Bros., 73 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1952).
" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OFTORTS §§ 89-90 (4th ed. 1971); Comment,
Nuisance-Reasonable Use, 50 Ky. L.J. 104 (1961-62).
"1 Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1974); Tolliver v.
Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Co., 290 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1956) (overruled by
Kentland); see also Ausness, Kentucky Law Survey: Torts, 63 Ky. L.J. 753, 772-75
(1974-75).
1 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 126 A. 386 (Pa. 1924), cert. denied
267 U.S. 592 (1925); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 716 (1975); Maloney,
Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Common-Lau) Remedies, 25
VAND. L. REV. 145, 151-52 (1972).
" Hines, Nor any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality 52 IOWA L.
REV. 186, 196-201 (1966).
" E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1513.01-.99 (page 1968), as amended, (Supp.
1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-.20 (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 58-1539 to 1564 (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-6-1 to 31 (1973),
as amended, (Supp. 1975).
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monly have some or all of the following features: permits for
surface mining must be obtained from an agency of the state;
a permit fee is collected; some degree of reclamation is re-
quired; the operator must post a bond which is recoverable
following satisfactory reclamation; and operators who have a
history of violations, usually failure to perform satisfactory re-
clamation, may be denied permits.a'
The current Kentucky legislation12 has all of these fea-
tures. The permit fee is $150 plus $35 for each acre, or fraction
thereof, to be mined. Permit applications must be accompa-
nied by substantial documentation indicating the natural and
man-made environmental features which may be affected by
surface mining.-" Permits may be denied on several grounds.
Important grounds for denial include a finding that reclama-
tion requirements will not be observed or that reclamation and
prevention of off-site damage is infeasible,5 and that the per-
mit applicant has a history of noncompliance with surface min-
ing regulations. Areas to be mined may be deleted if certain
types of private and public property will be threatened. 7 Set-
back provisions apply to surface mines in the vicinity of roads,
streams, and lakes." A bond of not less than $500 and not more
than $3,000 per acre and not less than a total of $5,000 must
be posted. 9 All but $300 per acre will be returned after
backfilling, grading, and soil stabilization has been completed
as required.'" The remainder will be returned after planting
and revegetation.' Backfilling requirements are related to the
type of terrain and method of mining. In the case of contour
mining on steep slopes, up to 40 percent of the overburden may
be placed beyond the solid bench and pushed down the slope.62
51 Note, Strip Mine Reclamation Regulation, 39 Mo. L. REV. 429 (1974).
52 Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 350.010-.990 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as KRS].
KRS § 350.060 (9).
KRS § 350.060(2)-(4).
5 KRS § 350.085(1)-(2).
' KRS § 350.130(3).
KRS § 350.085(3).
" KRS § 350.085(4).
5, KRS § 350.151(2).
0 KRS § 350.093(6).
61 Id.
12 KRS § 350.093(2)(h).
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During mining, steps must be taken to prevent slides and water
pollution due to sediment and acid run-off.
C. Regulation of Water Quality
The Water Pollution Control Act amendments 3 provide a
strong regulatory approach to the control of discharge from
point sources into navigable waterways and their nonnavigable
tributaries." The discretion of states to set standards is lim-
ited, and enforcement is a federal responsibility which may be
delegated to states which meet certain requirements.15 It seems
likely that, when the regulations for Kentucky receive ap-
proval," the 1972 federal act will require that run-off from sur-
face mines into streams and tributaries be intercepted and held
in holding or settling ponds. Discharge from holding ponds
will probably require a permit. The 1972 Act also enables the
regulation of water pollution from nonpoint sources. It seems
likely that, when regulations are eventually approved, run-off
from surface mines will be included amomg the nonpoint
sources regulated.
D. An Assessment from an Economic Perspective
Broad form mineral deeds were, for the most part, origi-
nally sold in unequal exchange between well-informed mineral
rights buyers and poor and ignorant mountaineer land owners,
half a century or more ago.6 The sellers could not reasonably
have been expected to foresee that surface mining methods of
extraction would be developed and that the sale of mineral
rights under the broad form deed arrangements would leave
33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
See generally 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1319 (Supp. 1976); Keppler, Mining and the
FWPCAA Of 1972, 20 RoCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 501 (1975).
'5 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (Supp. 1976). See Arnold, Effluent Limitations and NPDES:
Federal and State Implementation of the FWPCAA of 1972, 15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REV. 767 (1974).
11 Kentucky's water quality regulations under the 1972 Act do not yet have the
approval of EPA or the Attorney-General of Kentucky in spite of the expenditure of
considerable effort in the regulatory, political, and judicial areas. See D. R. Stevens,
Another Try for Water Pollution Rules, Louisville Courier-Journal, January 25, 1976,
at 6, sec. D.
67 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (Supp. 1976); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (12) (Supp. 1976).




their heirs without power to prevent surface mining or gain
compensation for damage caused by surface mining. 9 Because
of this, an argument based on the concept of economic equity
can be made in favor of some reassignment of rights to the
surface estate. Further, without modification of mineral rights
under the broad form deed, the potential of property and nuis-
ance law to control externality and thus promote economic
efficiency is severely limited, and approaches based on the po-
lice powers and the power to tax are essential.
From an economic perspective, the current Kentucky leg-
islation represents a reasonable, if imperfect, attempt at bal-
ancing the needs for energy production and environmental pro-
tection. However, concerns have been expressed as to the effec-
tiveness of enforcement.7" Indicators of effective enforcement
may be the rate of permit denials and bond forfeiture. 71 Since
mining and reclamation take several years, it is too soon to
make meaningful observations about bond forfeiture. Some
observers are concerned, however, that the rate of permit de-
nial and revocation has been rather low. 72 At this time, we are
confined to making the observation that the effectiveness of
existing Kentucky regulations is dependent on careful inspec-
tion, monitoring, and enforcement.
Those federal surface mining bills which have recently
been passed by Congress but vetoed by the President are not
stricter than the Kentucky legislation in their reclamation pro-
visions. However, they would set minimum standards for all
states, and thus eliminate the possible temptation for some
states to attract investment and employment in surface mining
by enacting lenient surface mining regulations or enforcing the
regulations in a lenient manner. They have included a tax of
35 cents per ton of surface mined coal and 10 cents per ton of
deep mined coal to be collected and used for reclamation of
11 Arguments along these lines have persuaded judges in many Appalachian
states, but not in Kentucky, to limit the rights of the mineral estate under the broad
form deed.
70 The CSPI Study, ENFORCEMENT OF STRIP MINING LAWS, supra note 27, has iden-
tified substantial deficiencies in the enforcement of surface mining regulations in
Kentucky. Louisville Courier-Journal, November 10, 1975, at 18, sec. A.
71 However, it must be noted that bond forfeiture would be unnecessary if all
operators were in full compliance.
71 See supra note 70.
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abandoned surface mining sites.13 The major impact of a fed-
eral bill on surface mining in Kentucky may be stricter enforce-
ment, if in fact federal supervision would lead to stricter en-
forcement.
In the light of our earlier discussion of economic efficiency
and methods for internalization of external diseconomies, it
may be appropriate to consider alternative institutional meth-
ods of controlling environmental damage from surface mining.
Privately negotiated solutions are unlikely because much of the
concern is for the protection of water quality and the aesthetic
qualities of the landscape, and such solutions have been rela-
tively ineffective in these settings.74 The methods of charges or
standards are more appropriate. Current Kentucky regulations
have some elements of both charges and standards since recla-
mation requirements constitute a standard, and the possibility
of bond forfeiture can be interpreted as a charge for creating
damage.
We suggest that as more economic information becomes
available about the benefits from surface mining control and
reclamation in various types of environments, the bonding re-
quirements become more flexible and thus more nearly ap-
proach a charge system. When our economic knowledge ad-
vances to the point that we can make good estimates of the
value of environmental damages as related to the degree of
reclamation undertaken in each type of environment mined,
the total bond can be equated with the total value of damage
when no reclamation and damage prevention efforts are under-
taken .7 f A schedule relating the performance of various recla-
mation and damage prevention procedures with the return of
various proportions of the total bond would be established.
Rational mining operators would control damages and reclaim
the land up to the point where the next step in reclamation
would cost more than the scheduled amount of the bond to be
" The ORNL study, supra note 38, indicates that this requirement would have
only a small impact on output and employment in the surface mining industry in
Appalachia.
" See Randall, Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 35 (1974).
" The existing studies supra notes 29, 35, and 38 suggest that current bonds in
Kentucky, which are often set at the minimum rate of $500 per acre, are not suffi-
ciently high to cover the value of damages generated as the total cost of reclamation.
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returned. Where full reclamation is very expensive, only partial
reclamation would be performed; where reclamation is less
costly, full reclamation would be completed. Where less than
full reclamation is performed, the proportion of the bond which
was forfeited would serve as compensation from the operator to
the public for damage created. This system would be preferable
to the current legislation which still allows some of the costs of
mining to be transferred to other affected parties.
There is, as we have indicated, some potential overlap
between the Kentucky surface mining regulations, which re-
quire that off-site damages be controlled, and the federal water
quality regulations which will eventually be enforced under the
1972 act. In keeping with the approach suggested above, it
seems appropriate that control of nonpoint water discharges
from surface mines during mining and maintenance of holding
ponds for run-off should be related to the return of the bond.
Failure to control off-site damages would result in partial for-
feiture of the bond according to a predetermined schedule
based on the value of damages caused. It would be concep-
tually simple to establish a charge system for discharge of
water; the cost of the discharge permit would be based on the
quantity of pollutants discharged and the per unit value of
damage caused. A rational operator would discharge pollutants
only when the costs of control or abatement exceed the costs
of the permits; in these cases the income from sale of permits
could be viewed as compensation for the affected public.
In summary, we are suggesting that as more and better
information on the economic value of environmental damages
caused by surface mining becomes available, current regula-
tory approaches be modified to approach charge systems in
order to take advantage of the desirable efficiency and equita-
ble characteristics inherent in charge systems.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Coal mining is a significant contributor to gross national
product and national employment, and often the major contri-
butor to local income and employment in the regions in which
it operates. The United States seems likely to become more
reliant on coal as a source of energy in the future. The industry
has a substantial impact on the regions in which it operates:
economically, socially, and environmentally.
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Laws and regulations provide much of the structure of
incentives which guide the economic, social, and environmen-
tal performance of economic units. Thus, it is well to establish
laws and regulations which guide economic activities in the
direction of efficiency and maximum social welfare. Our focus
has been narrow: the coal surface mining industry and its
environmental impact. A broader focus would have necessi-
tated discussion of labor regulations, health and safety regula-
tions, severance taxation, and taxation of mineral reserves in
the context of the coal industry. Under our approach, a solution
of the environmental problems created by the surface mining
industry should not be punitive. Rather, there should be a
legislative and regulatory environment in which the industry
continues to operate profitably and productively while inter-
nalizing the externalities it creates.
In this spirit regulatory policies ought to move, gradually
and cautiously as more reliable economic information becomes
available, toward a system of charges for damage created.
These kinds of systems provide continuing incentives for reduc-
tion of environmental damages and require the industry to
compensate the public for that damage which remains, while
leaving the industry free to develop and implement the most
cost-effective methods of damage abatement.
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